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THE IRREDUCIBLE OPPOSITION 
BETWEEN THE PLATONIC AND 
ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SOUL 
AND BODY IN SOME ANCIENT 
AND MEDIAEVAL THINKERS 
Kevin CORRIGAN 
RESUME. — Cet article voudrait montrer qu'on ne peut limiter sans plus la conception 
aristotélicienne de l'âme à la théorie de l'entéléchie. On y suggère aussi que 
l'opposition irréductible entre les formulations tranchées des positions platonicienne 
et aristotélicienne fut reconnue avant Thomas d'Aquin (par exemple par Plotin) 
et qu'une « réconciliation » de ces conceptions opposées fut alors entreprise. 
SUMMARY. — This article attempts to show that the Aristotelian view of soul was not 
absolutely limited to the entelechy theory. It further suggests that the irreducible 
opposition between the extreme formulations of the Platonic and Aristotelian 
positions was clearly recognised before Aquinas (in particular by Plotinus) and 
that an attempt was then made to "reconcile" the two theories. 
IN A RECENT book on Robert Grosseteste it is claimed that Grosseteste and his whole generation did not perceive the irreducible opposition between Plato's and 
Augustine's conception of the soul as substance and mover, and the Aristotelian 
definition of the soul as substantial form animating and perfecting the body. The 
contradiction, it is further stated, was not detected by anyone before Aquinas.1 It is 
true that this assessment implicitly recognises the quality of Aquinas' achievement in 
maintaining the biological and integrated individual unity of the human person while 
at the same time developing in a plausible Aristotelian manner (against the Platonists 
1. See J. MCEVOY, The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, Oxford 1982, pp. 263-264, pp. 273-274; cf. 
T. CROWLEY, Roger Bacon : The Problem of the Soul in his Philosophical Commentaries, Louvain 
—Dublin 1950, p. 191 ff. ; A.C. PEGIS, St. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth 
Century, Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto 1934, p. 147 ff. 
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and especially the Averroists) the notion of soul's self-subsistence in such a way as to 
include the essential spirit of Platonism in man's spiritual nature and yet to poi nt out 
the incompleteness of soul necessary to a holistic view of human development and to 
the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. In the light of this achievement the 
Platonic association of soul and body, where the essence of man resides in the soul or, 
according to the definition of Alcibiades /, man is "soul using body", can only appear 
to be an accidental union. It is, therefore, remarkable that so many Mediaeval 
thinkers (e.g. Alexander of Hales, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, St. Albert and 
St. Bonaventure) could hold simultaneously that soul is a complete substance and 
that it is form or entelechy of the body and feel naive confidence in employing 
Aristotelian language and arguments concerning the relationship between body and 
soul.2 Now, it is possible that a certain lack of reflection will account for this mistake. 
But there is more here than meets the eye. The assessment that the two positions are 
irreconcileable depends firstly, upon an extreme view of Platonism and secondly, 
upon the assumption that there is one view of soul in the Aristotelian corpus. I am 
going to suggest in this article that the irreducible opposition between extreme 
formulations of the Platonic and Aristotelian positions was clearly recognised before 
Aquinas and that an important attempt to develop Aristotelian thought on the basis 
of Aristotle's own principles was made long before Aquinas. This attempt made 
possible the proper philosophical assimilation of Aristotelian vocabulary in a 
Platonic cause. But before we can proceed further, we must clear up some of the basic 
terms and questions of the debate. For example, we can not significantly ask whether 
the two positions are irreconcileable in Aristotelian thought, since it was the Platonic 
conception which Aristotle was concerned to refute. Rather we must ask what is the 
meaning and scope of the entelechy doctrine itself and whether this meaning will 
change in the perspectives of different Aristotelian treatises (e.g. Physics and 
Metaphysics ) ? 
This will necessarily bring us to the question whether the two positions are 
irreconcileable in the tradition of interpretation. Here we will obtain two different, 
but not very helpful, answers. For some Peripatetic commentators (notably Alexander 
of Aphrodisias) they are irreconcileable. For many of the Greek commentators on 
Aristotle, for Middle Platonists, Neoplatonists and Platonisers in general, Aristotle 
and Plato were considered to be in perfect accord. To avoid this patently absurd 
conclusion we shall have to phrase our question in a different way and ask : (a) where 
there any good reasons for thinking that Aristotle and Plato could be reconciled on 
this matter, or — a different and easier question — that Plato could be reconciled 
with Aristote ? and (b) did any thinker confront the text of Aristotle (recognising that 
his position was inimical to that of Plato) in the attempt to make an interpretative 
development of Aristotle and Plato in philosophical terms which could be properly 
Aristotelian? This is the most fundamental question. And if we can answer it, it will 
also help us to understand why it is that St. Augustine, for instance, can state both 
that man is soul using a body and that man is not mere soul, nor mere body, but soul 
2. For a general survey see T. CROWLEY, op. cit., p. 119 ff. 
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and body,3 and why it is that Roger Bacon can argue that soul is the form of the body 
and yet that the body is the prison-house of the soul.4 
Our first question concerns the meaning of the entelechy doctrine itself? Prima 
facie, this is not in doubt. Soul and body are not two separable things or substances. 
Soul is the form (eidos), essence (ousia), definition (logos) or actuality (entelechy, 
energeia) of the physical, organic body, which does not have life without soul and 
which is therefore conceived to be in a dynamic relation to soul ("potentially having 
life").5 But whilst this definition indicates the intimate psycho-physical unity of man 
and rejects Platonic dualism, it is entirely another question whether it intends to 
dispense altogether with the language of psycho-physical dualism. For firstly (and 
especially for the pre-Jaegerian interpreter) we find juxtaposed in Aristotle a 
biological view of man and a different, much more Platonic view in which man is seen 
as a spiritual being in association with a living body. In fact, the gap between the 
biological composite and the more developed composite is emphasised even in the De 
Anima by Aristotle's distinction between what contributes to "being" and what 
contributes to "well-being". Air, for instance, is both a means of maintaining 
existence and also necessary to the production of speech, to well-being6. In what 
sense, then, is soul the entelechy of body and how are the two views of man to be 
related ? 
Secondly, Aristotle compares the relation of the soul to the body with the 
relation between the shape imprinted on the wax and the wax.7 But it is clear that the 
unity in animate things can not be exactly the same kind of unity as in inanimate 
things. And if the soul is incorporeal — no matter how intimately present to the 
body, the soul is not the shape, although it may be primarily manifested therein.8 
Thirdly, it has been argued recently9 that Nuyen's 10 attempts to delineate three 
stages in the development of Aristotle's psychology (e.g. (1) an early period where 
soul is a Platonic eidos, (2) a middle period of an instrumentalist notion in which the 
3. De Civ. Dei XIX, cap. 3 (on the views of Varro, Cicero, Antiochus and the Old Academy). 
4. See T. CROWLEY, op. cit., p. 120 and p. 123, who cites Opera Hactenus Inedita XI, p. 182 ("anima est 
actus per se et immediate corporis physici organici") and XI, p. 10 ("Unde anima infunditur in pejus, 
scilicet in corpus, non ut pejoretur, sed ut in pejori melioretur, unde ut mundificetur in ignominia et 
sanctificetur in sorde"). 
5. De Anima 412 A 26-27 : cf. the causal definition at De An. 414A 12-13 ("the soul is that by which we 
live, perceive and have understanding primarily"): cf. also Metaphysics 1035 B 14-16; 1043A 29 — 
1043 B 4. 
6. De An. 420 B 16-33. 
7. De An. 412 B 6-8 ; 10-15; cf. 412B 18-12 (the example of the living eye seems more appropriate : if the 
eye were a living creature, eyesight would be its soul). 
8. On this see the remarks of AQUINAS, Summa Contra Gentiles II, caput 68 : "Non autem minus est 
aliquid unum ex substantia intellectuali et materia corporali quam ex forma ignis et ejus materia, sed 
forte magis ; quia quanto forma magis vincit materiam, tanto ex ea et materia magis efficitur unum." 
Cf. the problems felt by Siger of Brabant, John of Jandun and others concerning an immaterial 
substantial form in A.C. PEGIS, "Some Reflections on Summa Contra Gentiles / /" , 56 (An Etienne 
Gilson Tribute, Milwaukee, 1959), p. 170 ff. 
9. By W.F.R. HARDIE, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, Oxford 1968, pp. 68-93. 
10. F. NUYENS, L'Évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote, Louvain 1948. 
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heart is the central organ and (3) the final soul-entelechy period) are seriously flawed 
and that some interpretation of the instrumentalist conception is not incompatible 
with the entelechy theory and finally that Aristotle himself leaves the question open 
at De Anima 413 A8-9.11 Doubtless, the sailor-ship analogy is too misleading in too 
many ways ; but even the possibility of the statement tends to support the more likely 
and less dogmatic hypothesis that Aristotle did not absolutely exclude other ways of 
looking at soul, or that, given the basic provisos of the entelechy theory, the theory 
still had room for flexible thinking and, therefore, could accomodate a spiritual view 
of man or a psycho-physical, dualist way of speaking, once the unity and concreteness 
of the animate sensible object had been secured.12 
Fourthly, — and perhaps most importantly — how is this essentially biological 
view of man, proposed in the De Anima, to be related to other elements in Aristotle's 
work ? We can pose this question in two ways : (a) Is the intellect a part of soul or is 
the intellect, as Aristotle proposes in De Gen. Anim., "from outside"? (b) Is the soul 
primarily the domain of the physicist or does the metaphysician also have something 
to say on the subject ? This was a pressing problem in the history of interpretation.13 
Fifthly, and finally (following from the previous question), if soul is the form or 
substance of an organic body, and if it is according to the form that the composite 
and the matter are said to be individual things, and if the form is the highest instance 
of the thing, what relation does soul have to the matter as manifested in the ouv0£ioc 
oûoia? This could be taken to be the central problem of Metaphysics ZH0. 1 4 
These problems, then, will serve to show that the entelechy doctrine, while 
apparently unambiguous on the surface, very quickly loses its appearance of solidity 
when examined more closely. 
Our second question concerns the history of interpretation. At the end of the 
Middle Ages Cardinal Cajetan, in his commentary on the De Anima,15 distinguishes 
two extreme positions : on the one hand, the view that the study of soul is primarily 
the work of the metaphysician, and only secondarily the work of the physicist ; on the 
other hand, the view that this study belongs entirely to physics. He himself rejects 
both views and adopts the theory that the study belongs primarily to the physicist, 
and only secondarily to the metaphysician. Broadly speaking the two extreme 
positions can be illustrated, on the one hand, from Alexander of Aphrodisias, a 
Peripatetic commentator of the 2nd century A.D., and, on the other, from Simplicius, 
a Neoplatonist and commentator on Aristotle of the 6th century. Alexander held that 
the human soul developed out of the mixture of the body's elements. The soul is 
different from the elements and supervenes upon the mixture, but as a logos in matter 
11. HARDIE, op. cit., pp. 81-82. 
12. See HARDIE, pp, 82-83. Whether or not one can accept Hardie's argument in toto, his call for a more 
flexible understanding of the entelechy theory deserves to be taken seriously. 
13. On this see below. 
14. Cf. Metaphysics Z 17 on the causal definition of man. Soul is the cause or principle of the body in three 
senses, formal, final and efficient, De An. 415 B 8-20. 
15. Commentaria in De Anima Aristotelis. (Rome 1938), vol. I, pp. 55-57. 
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(enulos logos) it can not exist separately and, therefore, is corrupted together with the 
body.16 In order to safeguard the idealist side of Aristotle's thought, he introduced a 
theory of three intellects culminating in the active intellect, but the relationship 
between the active intellect and the individual soul is obscure. Alexander, then, is a 
good example of one tendency in Aristotle's work : soul as the form of body 
constitutes a biological explanation, and as such seems to have reference solely to the 
realm of physics. 
Simplicius, by contrast, takes a broader view. Following Iamblichus, and 
Proclus, he finds that Aristotle's definition of soul applies properly to the embodied 
soul, but does not exhaust the full significance of soul, soul's intelligence or the wider 
universe of soul in itself.17 For the Neoplatonists a principle can be looked at in two 
ways : as it is in itself and in so far as it acts as a cause to something beneath itself. 
The examination of soul's own essence is more properly the work of Metaphysics. 
Similarly for Avicenna in the 11th century the Aristotelian definition as the study of 
the relation of soul to body pertains to physics : but for the proper study of soul's 
essence, a different kind of research is necessary.18 
The Neoplatonic two tier interpretation, soul as a self-subsistent substance and 
soul as the organising form of the body seems far removed from the perspective of 
Aristotle's De Anima, and this is not mitigated by Simplicius' statement that Aristotle 
is the best interpreter of Plato !19 True it is that some of Plato's many statements on 
the nature of soul and body (especially on the making of the All Soul in the Timaeus, 
that it is compounded from the indivisible essence and the essence divided about 
bodies20) could quite naturally (and carelessly) be taken to include in their extension 
the meaning of the Aristotelian doctrine. In this sense it is always easier to 
"reconcile" Plato with Aristotle than vice versa. True it also is that one can hardly 
dispense with psycho-physical dualistic ways of speaking, or indeed with the two 
poles of the history of the term psyche, vulnerability and value,21 or perhaps with the 
language of the movements which did most to develop its transcendental significance 
(eg. Orphism, Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Christianity). However, as to the inter-
pretation of Aristotle, if Alexander's view of soul was too materialistic, and if the 
Neoplatonists' view was too syncretistic, was it possible nonetheless to find some 
common ground between Plato and Aristotle where a fruitful development could 
take place. The answer, I think, is yes. "Reconciliation" in this case, however, means 
16. ALEXANDER, De Anima, Liber Cum Mantissa (Bruns), p. 24, 21-24; p. 25, 2-9; p. 17, 11-15. 
17. SIMPLICIUS, In De Anima (Hayduck), p. 87, 18; p. 18, 20 ff. 
18. On this see G. Verbeke's introduction, p. 11, to S. VAN RIET, Avicenna Latinus, Liber De Anima seu 
Sextus de Naturalibus IV-V, Louvain/Leiden-Brill 1968. 
19. In De Anima, p. 245, 12. 
20. Timaeus 35A. 
21. The immense complexity of this topic even in Homer can be glimpsed by comparing E. ROHDE, 
Psyche : The cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks, New York, 1966; R.B. ONIANS, 
The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Soul, the work, Time and Fate, Cambridge, 1954; 
B. SNELL, The Discovery of the Mind, New York, 1953. The limited point I wish to make here is that in 
Homer, since psyche is that which stands to be lost in battle or in the trials of homecoming, psyche is 
both vulnerable and of inestimable value. See its usage in Iliad 9 especially (322, 401-409). 
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something rather different. If Thomas Aquinas adopts the viewpoint of Aristotle as 
his place of departure and makes his way from there into uncharted territory, a 
philosopher of the third century A.D., Plotinus, starts from Plato and looks at 
Aristotle from that standpoint. This adoption of a position from the start means that 
"reconciliation" in both cases will have to be interpretive development. 
It will seem unlikely at first sight that a Platonic thinker like Plotinus could be 
sympathetic to Aristotle on the questions of soul and body and the definition of man ; 
and indeed he is not. It has even been suggested by the foremost contemporary 
commentator on Plotinus' psychology that he may not have understood the spirit of 
the Aristotelian doctrine at all.22 However, in an early treatise IV, 7 (2), chapter 8 (5),23 
and following, Plotinus makes several criticisms of Aristotle's entelechy doctrine, and 
Alexander's materialistic interpretation thereof, which are pertinent to the issue at 
hand and implicitly set forth some of the consquences of interpretation. Plotinus 
argues that if the soul-entelechy is to be interpreted as the shape of a statue in relation 
to the bronze, then not only will this make nonsense of the distinction between first 
and second entelechies24, but we will not be able to account for the development of 
the higher faculties of reason and perhaps even perception (IV, 7, 8, (5), 5-15). For 
this reason, he continues, Aristotelians have to duplicate psychic reality and 
introduce a second soul or intellect, an entelechy of a different sort. But if the second 
soul, the reasoning soul or intellect, is to be immortal, why not also the lower 
faculties of soul, since experience tends to show that, even though they depend upon 
corporeal functions, they too can be separable (lines 15-43)? 
It is certainly true that much of this criticism is proposed against the general 
background of Platonism and specifically the doctrine of metensomatosis ; but 
Plotinus' arguments are pertinent nonetheless. He proposes that if one understands 
entelechy in terms of one of the examples Aristotle uses (in terms of the physical-
sensible shape), then one will have to end up with some kind of materialism where the 
soul will be defined as Alexander defines it, as an enulon eidos, a form which belongs 
to a particular body of a certain kind.25 And if one wants to avoid multiplying entities 
in the explanation of soul's relation to body, it will be more natural to align soul (in 
the sense of what it means to be ensouled) with body and shape.26 This is not to 
separate form and shape abstractly, but rather to recognise that form and matter are 
different explanations and ultimately have to be treated as such. The principle which 
underlies Plotinus' criticism is this : if one is going to define the xi eon , one must try 
to define it at its best.27 He argues this against Stoic materialism and even in the case 
22. H.J. BI.UMENTHAL, Plotinus' Psychology, Nijhoff 1971, p. 12. 
23. In IV, 7 [2], 8 (5), the roman numeral IV, represents the Ennead, the first arabic numeral, the treatise 
number, and the second, in square brackets, the chronological number of the treatise according to 
Prophyry's account in the Vita Plotini ; the third arabic numeral gives the chapter and the fourth in 
brackets indicates, exceptionally, that this is the fifth of five chapter eights. Normally, the line number 
will follow immediately after the chapter number. 
24. Cf. lines 9-11. I take this to be the point of Plotinus' statement that a retreat into sleep will become 
impossible, if the entelechy is to be so understood. 
25. Cf. ALEXANDER, De Anima, p. 120, 10; Quaestiones II, 10, p. 55. 9- 13. 
26. Cf. I, 1 [53], 4, 18-25. 
27. Cf. IV, 7 [2], 10,27-30. 
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of forms in matter he insists, with reason, that even if the form is as inseparable as it 
can be from matter, we must try to understand it bare.28 Now if it is true that in 
Aristotle's Metaphysics the form is the primary instance of the substance, not 
abstractly separated, but an indwelling reality, and if the form is the object of 
definition according to which the individual substance is known29, then the principle 
that Plotinus is urging in the case of soul may not be entirely indefensible on 
Aristotelian grounds. 
Plotinus, therefore, feels compelled to interpret Aristotle's doctrine of soul and 
body in the light of the Metaphysics primacy of form ; and it is important to realise 
that the so called tertium quid, "which Plotinus called the Çœov or Guva(i(pÔTspov" 30 
(Dodds p. 244) and which he interposed between soul and body, has to be understood 
in terms of a hierarchy of form, compound and matter, in which the two latter terms 
derive their "thisness" and separability from the form. Nowhere is this more evident 
than in his treatment of the nature of man in VI, 7 (38), 4-5. How will we define "this 
man"? he asks. Will his definition be different from the soul which makes him, or 
will such a soul be man, or will man be soul using a body of a specific kind? But if 
man is a rational animal, and an animal, or living creature, is a compound of soul 
and body, then the definition of man can not be identical with that of soul. But, 
having granted that, a further problem suggests itself; if the definition of man is a 
compound of rational soul and body, how could it be an eternal reality, for the 
definition is simply indicative : it tells you "that", but not "why". It simply points to 
the physical reality in front of you, which is clearly already a compound, and says 
AB ; whereas the whole point of definition is that it should include the cause, or in 
another way of speaking, that it should tell you why the matter is disposed in such 
and such a way.31. 
Plotinus resumes that man can only be known according to the definition. 
Having dealt with a simplistic, indicative definition of the sensible compound, he 
next turns to another major problem from the Metaphysics — the logical universal. 
Can a man, he asks, be a compound of the form and matter taken universally and in 
this sense a lôôe êv xcoÔs? His answer is definitive; if we take it in this way, we do not 
take account of "that according to which each individual thing is"32 . Even if and 
especially if, we are dealing with forms in matter and definitions which must include 
matter, if we are to define the TO xi fjv eïvai sep' éKàaioo correctly, the definition 
must include the productive cause of man ; and this, what it means to be man (TO 
eîvai àv0pa)7i(p), is that which makes this man, indwelling, not separate (TI écm TÔ 
7r£7ioir)K:ôç TOOTOV TÔV dv6po)7cov EVU7idpxov, oC x^Plo"Tov).33 Plotinus, therefore, 
following Aristotle's cardinal principles of definition, suggests that the definition of 
28. See IV, 7 [2], 4, 19-20 and II, 7 [37], 3, 12-14. 
29. Cf. Metaphysics 1042 A 28-29, 1070 A 11-12; De An. 412 A 7-9; Metaphysics 1031 B 6-7; 1037 A 5. 
30. This is the assessment of E.R. DOODS, Proclus — The Elements of Theology, Oxford 1963, p. 244. 
31. VI, 7 [38], 4, 6-21 ; cf. De An. 413A 13-16 ; Post. An. II, 93 A 4-5 ; Metaphys. Z 17 Passim. 
32. Lines 21-23 : El 8é TIÇ Xéyoç TÔV A-ôyov ôeï TÔV TÔV TOIOUTCOV elvai auvafxcpÔTSpôv TI, TÔÔ' êv TWOS, 
Ka0' ô êaTiv etcaaTov, ODK à^ioî Xéyeiv. 
33. Lines 18-30, cf. De An. 413 A 15: (8eî)... Tf|v ak iav êvu7tâpx£iv KOÙ sjicpaiveaOat. 
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man can not be a merely indicative definition of the sensible compound, nor can it be 
a logical universal, for this misses both the TO TI fjv eivai and the particular 
substance, but that it must be definition of the form which contains and manifests the 
cause, includes the matter, and is so intimately present to the particular that the latter 
is thereby also defined correctly. Therefore, Plotinus concludes, since man can not be 
soul alone, why can he not be a compound, auvajKpÔTEpôv it, soul in a logos of a 
determinate kind (vj/ux'hv £V Toicpôe Xôyq)) the logos being an activity of a certain kind 
which is not empowered without the acting subject?34 For Plotinus, therefore, the 
form is prior to both the universal and the singular, and in light of the form 
indwelling in the singular substance, the definition of man is simultaneously a 
definition of the species and also of this man. 
Some of St. Thomas' major problems with Platonism consisted in the fact that 
the unity of soul and body could only be conceived as an accidental union, that the 
unity, if such there were, was a unity of operation and not of esse, and thirdly, that 
there could not be a union of two essentially separate substances.35 From the analysis 
of the above chapter of the Enneads we can see that Plotinus' answer to these 
problems would have been subtle indeed. Firstly, at the level of definition, which is 
not an abstract level, but the most concrete level of form, the unity of soul and body 
is an essential unity ; and since the form is not separate from the individual thing, but 
rather illuminates its potential meaning, this is also true of the individual man, "this 
man". Secondly, the union of soul and body is not just a unity of operation, but since 
this unity includes the making cause it is also a unity of being. Thirdly, and by 
contrast, when one looks (literally) to the material compound (the object of 
indicative definition solely) one is looking not so much to substance (which is KCITCX 
xov ^oyov) as to accidentality. It is in this sense that for Plotinus so called "sensible 
substance" is in fact a "collection of qualities in matter"36. Therefore, the object of 
indicative definition, the compound of soul and body, is indeed an accidental union, 
for even if it succeeds in touching upon something substantial, it is still a "union" of 
substance (grounded in the causal definition) and accident.37 
In the above chapter of the Enneads Plotinus is clearly arguing for an 
interpretation of Aristotle. Whether or not one agrees with the Platonic use to which 
he will eventually subject this argument, it seems to me that this is the most important 
interpretation of Aristotle before Aquinas, an interpretation not only of the 
Metaphysics, but also of some of Aristotle's statements in the De Anima concerning 
definition and the unity of the three causes (formal, final and efficient) in soul. It is 
evident that Aristotle himself believed that the study of psyche contributed much to 
the understanding of nature.38 But if this study is also to be related to man's higher 
nature and to the "whole field of truth", then perhaps the most penetrating link is to 
34. VI, 7 [38], 5, 1-5. 
35. See eg. Summa Contra Gentiles II, 56, 57. Sumrna Theologica I, O. 76 (espec. articles 3 and 4). 
36. Cf. VI, 3 [44], 8, 19-23. 
37. Cf. Il, 6 [17], 3,24-29. 
38. Cf. De An. 402 A 4 ff. De Part. An. 641 A 21 ff. 
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be sought in the nature of form and the non-abstract causal definition grounded in 
that nature. 
Of course, Plotinus will now go on to speak of "soul using body". Indeed, for 
him, the "subject" can be viewed (1) as the material substratum or (2) as "that which 
posseses", the compound of soul and body or (3) as the form. But he will also speak 
of the compound being by virtue of the soul in the manner of Aristotle's second 
definition in the De Anima 414 A 12-13 ("soul is that by which we live, perceive and 
think primarily")39 And although the intelligible universe is to the forefront of his 
thinking, the human intellectual soul does start upon its historical existence as a kind 
of tabula rasa, requiring considerable development before its potential powers can be 
brought to actuality.40 Moreover, like Aquinas (but unlike Avicenna), he rejects the 
description of soul in body sicut nauta in navi and is much more concerned to explore 
the meaning of soul's presence in body.41 
Plotinus may, therefore, extend the soul-body range in a way unfamiliar to 
Aristotelians, but he is doing this on the grounds that the soul is an immaterial cause 
or form, which unites in itself formal, final and efficient causality, and which is 
present to matter where, by virtue of what it gives to body (i.e. by virtue of the real 
effect is has upon body)42, it makes not just a material compound, but "something 
different". Plotinus even uses the Aristotelian phrase from Metaphysics Z 17, sxspov 
xi, to emphasize this point.43 For him, therefore, the soul is not in matter as in a 
substratum, nor is it the form of body if by this is intended a form which belongs to 
matter. Soul must be immaterial, self-subsistent and the productive form of a body of 
a specific kind. Hence, the doctrine that soul is self-subsistent and that it is the causal 
form of the body stands at the heart of Neoplatonism's dialogue with Aristotelianism. 
On the other hand, although the soul's presence in body is the more powerful and 
intimate because of its immateriality, and although soul can also make herself 
"enmattered" (enule)44, soul is not a "sense" form as such, and, therefore, the notion 
of corporeity can come to the fore in a new way. For Plotinus corporeity can mean 
two things : the basic compound (sometimes termed body qua body) or the enulos 
logos. As we have emphasised above, the latter is to be understood properly in terms 
of soul. The former (although by no means a fixed conceptual point in Plotinus) is 
simply the recognition that matter is never without form, that the individual soul 
builds upon nature (i.e. there are secondary causes)45 and that, however one may 
39. This is especially characteristic of one of his last works, I, 1 [53] ; see eg. Chapter 13. 
40. I, 1 [53], 11, Iff. 
41. Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles II, 57. Plotinus, IV, 3 [27], 21, 5-11. 
42. Plotinus speaks of "a sort of light" it gives to body (I, 1 [53], 7, 4). In his earlier work on psychology, 
however, he prefers the image of air that is heated (IV, 4 [28], 14, 2-10). Clearly, ensouled warmth is 
not too far removed from Aristotle's "psychic warmth" conveyed in the pneuma (De Gen. An. 
762A21). 
43. ARISTOTLE, Metaphysics 1041 B 17 and 19. Plotinus, I, 1 [53], 7, 1 ff. 
44. Cf. I, 8 [51], 13,21-26; 14, 18. 
45. Cf. ST. BONA VENTURE, In IV Sent, d. 43, a. 1, q. 4, concl. "Supponamus nunc quod natura aliquid 
agat, et illud non agit de nihilo, et cum agat in materiam, oportet quod producat formam". 
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view body, there is no denying the fact that (without soul) it is a corruptible 
aggregate. 
This double two tier system or continuum — (a) that soul is a self-subsistent 
substance and also the productive or highest substantial form of the body and 
(b) that the ensouled body can also be viewed in two ways as a substantial form or as 
an aggregate of qualities in a substratum — is, perhaps paradoxically, developed out 
of a reflection upon the text of Aristotle and its implications ; and it was transmitted 
in ancient and mediaeval times not only through the later history of Neoplatonism, 
but also through Arabic thought (notably Avicenna) and especially through the Fons 
Vitae of the Jewish philosopher, Avicebron, to the works of Dcminicus Gundissalinus 
where it became accessible to St. Bonaventure, Robert Grosseteste, Roger Bacon etc. 
For it is clearly in Plotinian Neoplatonism and its interpretive development of 
Aristotle that the whole question of the plurality of forms comes to a head for the 
first time. Indeed, the theory of light worked out in Bonaventure, Grosseteste and 
Bacon depends ultimately upon an understanding of this continuum. But this topic is 
too vast to be treated separately here. 
Perhaps the most fascinating result of the present enquiry, however, is the 
discovery that this original theory of a plurality of forms in no way prejudices the 
essential, causal unity of body and soul and the substantial unity of man. Rather, it 
takes account of the logic of the living compound, namely, that both the accident in 
the substratum and the definition of body must be distinguishable in notion from the 
nature of soul in body. At the same time it does not preclude a further analysis into 
the loci of substantial form and prime matter. However, for Plotinus, prime matter 
here will be the barest logical subject, whereas for Aquinas it is the proper subject of 
life.46 
In conclusion, I wish to suggest firstly, that for Bonaventure (and Robert 
Grosseteste) to define soul as both the "actus et entelechia corporis humani" and 
"hoc aliquid"47 is not necessarily to misinterpret or ignore the spirit of Aristotle's 
psychology. Instead one may well argue that this definition implicitly recognises 
(a) that it is by means of the "thisness" of the substantial form that the biological and 
the intellectual are to be united and (b) that soul's relation to body must be conceived 
according to its substantial ratio ("non accidentalem, quia ratione illius est anima 
forma substantialis"48). Furthermore, the perception that the unity of rational soul 
and body is not the unity of form and matter in the stone or even the tissue leads 
properly to a perception of the more perfect unity of the human individual. And this 
is at the centre of Bonaventure's thought on the human person.49 
Secondly, in the case of Roger Bacon the fact that, amidst the Aristotelian 
formulae, body is also described as the prison-house of soul is not necessarily 
46. Cf. AQUINAS, De Anima, N. 222. 
47. BONAVENTURE, / / Sent, d. 18, a. 2, q. l,fundam. 
48. II Sent, d. l ,p . 2, a. 3, q. 2, opinio 3. Cf. also on the question of individuation IISent, d. 18, 1.2., q. 1, 
conclusio ad 1. 
49. On this see E. GILSON, The Philosophy of St. Bonaventure, St. Anthony Guild Press, Paterson, N.J. 
1965, pp. 285-307. 
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evidence that Bacon radically misunderstood Aristotle, but rather that he could see 
Aristotle in a larger context such as we have outlined here, a context in which man 
can perceive and live an accidental union between "soul" and "body". The 
perfectability of man must lie within the scope of his nature, but in no simple sense is 
it the form of matter. 
Thirdly, when St. Augustine defines man in radically different ways (soul using a 
body and neither soul nor body, but soul and body) he is drawing primarily upon 
Plato (Alcibiades I and Phaedrus 246 C 5 ; and, as we have indicated above, Platonic 
formulae can more easily be taken to include Aristotelian positions than vice-versa), 
and also upon ways of speaking basic to classical antiquity and indeed to the history 
of psyche/'anima-animus. In this context Aristotle's De Anima, Bk.2, is ignored ; but it 
is perhaps understood that it does not express the whole of the picture. On the other 
hand, Augustine can stress the union of soul and body in a way which would not have 
been unfamiliar to Plotinus ("the soul forms the material of the body which it 
animates into a harmonious unity and secures and preserves its integrity").50 
Finally, this presentation seeks to correct the commonly held view that no one 
understood, or confronted, Aristotle's entelechy-form theory before Aquinas. It 
does not seek to undermine Aquinas' unique development of that theory, but only to 
present an important interpretation of Aristotle which should be known for its own 
sake and also for the extra light it seems to shed upon the positions of some 
Mediaeval thinkers. When one looks generally at Plotinian Neoplatonism and at 
St. Thomas on this subject, the gulf separating the two seems immense. Different 
world views, different methodologies, the plurality of forms, hylomorphic composi-
tion of soul, the mortality of animal souls, metensomatosis, resurrection of the body 
— the list of distinguishing characteristics seems endless. However, what is fascinating 
to realise is that, despite even the difference of approach, both Plotinus and Aquinas 
seek a solution to the problem in the causal definition of man. For both, if the soul is 
that by which the human body exists, then the human soul is the cause and form of 
the human body. For both, an intellectual substance is not immersed in matter or 
totally comprehended by matter51, but forms a more perfect union with body "quam 
ex forma ignis et ejus materia".52 For both, man is truly a spiritual, intellectual 
creature. Ultimately, both seek the reason why the matter is so and so, how an 
intellectual substance can be united to a body as its substantial form.53 An affinity of 
insight, therefore, should also be remarked, even if we cannot explore the finer details 
of the problem in this place. 
50. De Gen. c. Man. II, 7, 9. This passage is cited and translated by R. A. Markus, "Marius Victorinus and 
Augustine", p. 358 in The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Mediaevel Philosophy, ed. 
A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge 1970. 
51. S.C.G. II, 69 (Non Autem Oportet...). S.T. 1, Q. 76, a. 1, ad 4. 
52. S.C.G. 11,68. 
53. S.C.G. II, 56 and 68. S.T. I, Q. 76, a. 5, Respondeo. 
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